

Mental Representation (Survey of Philosophy of Mind) - A. Mendelovici

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Some mental states seem to be of, about, represent, or “say” something. For example, a perceptual experience of a cup on a table might represent that there is a cup on a table, and a belief that grass is green might be about the proposition that grass is green. This is *mental representation*, and this course examines its nature. We will address questions such as the following: What is a theory of mental representation a theory of? What is the correct theory of mental representation? Can mental representation be explain in terms of broadly physical phenomena? Does what a subject represents depend solely on how the subject is from the skin-in, or do environmental factors also play a role? Is mental representation a relation to a represented content, and, if so, what kinds of things are contents? Can mental representation explain phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, qualitative, or felt aspect of mental life? Can phenomenal consciousness explain mental representation?